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A corporation whose stock is traded on any national stock exchange is
subject to the disclosure requirements of both the federal securities laws1
and stock exchange rules.- The purpose of disclosure is to provide inves-
tors with adequate information on which to base investment decisions and
to maintain fair and orderly securities markets.3
Premature disclosure of corporate merger negotiations, however, poses a
substantial threat to investors because of the likelihood that disclosure will
cause the negotiations to terminate, causing shareholders to lose valuable
merger premiums. In recognition of this potential loss, both Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5" and the rules of the major stock ex-
changes 5 generally permit corporations to delay disclosure of merger nego-
tiations until the parties reach an agreement in principle to merge.6
When rumors develop or there is unusual trading activity in a stock,
however, stock exchange rules do require that a corporation either disclose
the reason for the unusual activity or make a public statement to the effect
1. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
2. See NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 2, reprinted in 3 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 11 23,513-23,557 (1985) [hereinafter NYSE MANUAL]; AMERICAN STOCK EX-
CHANGE COMPANY GUIDE §§ 401-05, reprinted in 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) i 23,124A-23,124E
(1985) [hereinafter ASE GUIDE].
3. Assertions of the policies underlying the disclosure requirements of the Securities Acts are in-
cluded in H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1933) (statement of President Roosevelt that
1933 Act is "but one step in our broad purpose of protecting investors"); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); SEC, THE WORK OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V
(1974) [hereinafter WORK OF THE SEC] ("securities laws were designed to facilitate informed invest-
ment analyses and prudent and discriminating investment decisions"); Hewitt, Developing Concepts of
Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAW. 887, 891 (1977) (investors protected by disclosure "in that
members of the securities industry would be deterred from engaging in questionable practices");
NYSE MANUAL, supra note 2, 23,515 ("[a] sound corporate disclosure policy is essential to the
maintenance of a fair and orderly securities market"); ASE GUIDE, supra note 2, 23,124A ("the
conduct of a fair and orderly market requires every listed company to make available to the public
information necessary for informed investing"); see also infra notes 11-12.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
5. The two major American stock exchanges are the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the
American Stock Exchange (ASE). The NYSE is the more important in terms of the value of stock
traded. Approximately 94% of trading (based on the dollar value of traded stocks) takes place on
either the NYSE or the ASE. SECURITIES, EXCHANGES AND THE SEC 65 (P. Tyler ed. 1965).
6. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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that it knows of "no corporate development" that would account for the
unusual activity.7 Some courts, as well as the SEC, have recently taken
the position that "no corporate development" statements issued during
preliminary merger negotiations may be materially false or misleading
and thus may violate Rule 10b-5.'
The conflict between these recent holdings and the stock exchange rules
leaves corporate management in a quandary over appropriate disclosure
when unusual trading activity develops in the corporation's stock during
preliminary merger negotiations. Disclosure of the negotiations may result
in loss to the corporation's shareholders, whereas nondisclosure may result
in a suit by a disappointed shareholder under Rule 10b-5. This Note ar-
gues that the policies underlying the federal securities laws,9 namely pro-
tecting investors' economic interests and encouraging efficient capital re-
source allocation, are best served by holding that a corporation does not
violate Rule 10b-5 when it issues a "no corporate development" statement
while engaged in preliminary merger negotiations. This Note proposes a
standard of constructive immateriality for use in analyzing "no corporate
development" statements for the purposes of 10b-5 liability.
I. CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created a scheme of mandatory
disclosure of important corporate information and prohibited fraudulent
practices.10 The 1934 Act's disclosure requirements were adopted to
protect investors 1 and to promote the allocative efficiency of the stock
markets.1 2 Supplementing the 1934 Act's periodic disclosure require-
7. NYSE MANUAl., supra note 2, § 202.03, at 23,517; IASE GUIDE, supra note 2, § 401(d), at
I 23,124A. Some commentators have characterized the exchanges as "paper tigers" because the ex-
changes have allegedly failed to enforce their rules stringently. See Kaufmann & Hoyns, Disclosure
Dilemma: What To Say When the Exchange Calls?, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 3. Any disin-
clination of the exchanges to enforce their rules through extended trading halts or delisting may be the
result of competition from so-called "third-market" securities firms that continue to trade exchange-
listed stocks after trading is halted on a major exchange. Recent proposals to extend trading halt
requirements to third-market firms would eliminate the competitive threat posed by those firms when
a major exchange halts trading. Hertzberg, SEC Is Urged To Extend Rules on Halts in Trading To
Cover Third-Market Firms, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1986, at 4, col. 3.
8. Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 747 (6th Cir. 1986); Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc.,
582 F. Supp. 128, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Carnation Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) T 83,801, at 87,592 (July 8, 1985).
9. See supra note 3.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982) (periodic disclosures to SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982) (antifraud
provisions).
11. See, e.g., WORK OF THE SEC, supra note 3, at vii (primary purpose of 1934 Act is protection
of investors' interests); Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Member: Liability for Violation of
Stock Exchange Rules, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 1120, 1147 (1970) (1934 Act contains over 50 separate
references to goal of investor protection).
12. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933); R. KARMEL, REGULATION BY
PROSECUTION 259 (1977) (securities markets are "nation's primary mechanism for allocating eco-
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ments,1 3 the Act's antifraud provisions impose additional requirements
concerning corporate disclosure.1 4 In particular, SEC Rule 10b-5,"5
promulgated under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, prohibits false or mis-
leading statements or omissions of material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security.
Pursuing the goal of protecting investors through full and complete
disclosure, both the courts and the SEC have interpreted Rule 10b-5
nomic resources among competing companies"); Friend, The SEC and the Economic Performance of
Securities Markets, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 190
(H. Manne ed. 1969) (allocative efficiency has been traditionally regarded as "most important eco-
nomic function" of securities markets); Schoenbaum, The Relationship Between Corporate Disclosure
and Corporate Responsibility, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 565, 576-77 (1972) ("The concept of assuring a
free and open securities market also has the aim of improving the allocative efficiency of the capital
markets."); see also Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regu-
lation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1977) (one purpose of Securities Acts
was to improve economic functioning of markets and thus to improve resource allocation).
Goals of the securities laws are often framed in terms of disclosure. See, e.g., Kahan v. Rosenstiel,
424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir. 1970) (1934 Act "designed to eliminate deceptive and unfair practices in
security trading and to protect the public from inaccurate, incomplete and misleading information");
Block, Barton & Garfield, Affirmative Duty To Disclose Material Information Concerning Issuer's
Financial Condition and Business Plans, 40 Bus. LAW. 1243 (1985) [hereinafter Affirmative Duty]
(central goal of Securities Acts is ensuring that investors "will be adequately informed of material
information" affecting value of securities). Disclosure, however, is properly viewed not as an end in
itself, but rather as means by which to effect the primary goals of protecting investors and improving
resource allocation. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 709 (1984) ("The principal benefit usually asserted for mandatory
disclosure is that investors will make more money.").
In fairness to the SEC, it should be noted that this fundamentally economic conception of the
purposes of the Securities Acts has not been universally recognized. See, e.g., SEC, DISCLOSURE TO
INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34
ACTS (THE WHEAT REPORT) 50-54 (1969) (policies underlying SEC Rule 10b-5 include disclosure,
promoting free and honest markets, protection of investors, and fostering investor trust); Comment,
Corporate Disclosure of Merger Negotiations-When Does the Investor Have a Right To Know?, 36
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1155, 1170-78 (1985) (non-economic analysis of disclosure obligations imposed by
Rule lOb-5 in merger context).
13. Corporations are required to file annual and quarterly reports with the SEC, as well as
documents required to keep these filings reasonably current. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1982). See generally
R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 441-75 (1982) (comprehensive treatment of
SEC periodic disclosure requirements).
14. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits "any manipulative or deceptive
device" that contravenes "such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982). See
generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 13, at 705-1119 (discussing 1934 Act's antifraud
provisions).
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). Rule 10b-5 provides that
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit on any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id. See generally A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5 (1980) (discussing Rule lob-5 and its
judicial application).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 96: 547, 1987
broadly."' For example, courts have construed Rule 10b-5 to require in-
siders to disclose material information prior to trading in a corporation's
securities.17 The Rule also requires disclosure when necessary to ensure
that corporate statements are not materially false or misleading (as these
terms have been interpreted by courts).'8 But despite the 1934 Act's gen-
eral policy-expanded by courts and the SEC-of encouraging disclosure
of material corporate information, 9 Rule 10b-5 has not been held to im-
pose a general obligation of continuous and complete disclosure of mate-
rial information.2"
The rules of the major stock exchanges,2" however, do impose signifi-
cant disclosure obligations on listed corporations beyond those imposed by
the federal securities laws. Unlike Rule 10b-5, stock exchange rules man-
date full and immediate disclosure by corporations of all material infor-
mation. The exchanges may enforce these rules by making violations pub-
lic, temporarily suspending trading in a corporation's stock, or instituting
a proceeding to delist a corporation's stock.22 The rules of the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) provide, for example, that a listed corporation
16. Justice Rehnquist has characterized Rule 10b-5 as a "judicial oak which has grown from
little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737
(1975); see also L. Loss, FUNDAMEN'rAis OF SECURr'Is RE(;UIATION 820 (1983) ("it is difficult to
think of another instance in the entire corpusjuris in which the interaction of the legislative, adminis-
trative rulemaking, and judicial processes has produced so much from so little"); Kripke, Rule lob-5
Liability and "Material" Facts, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 1061, 1062 (1971) ("[ilt is an anomaly that so
important an element of the federal law of corporations as lOb-5 should stand on so flimsy a base").
17. See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
18. Texas Gulf, 401 F.2d at 833.
19. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1933).
20. For discussion of cases holding that there is no duty of continuous disclosure under Rule lob-
5 in the absence of insider trading or other special circumstances, see Feuerstein, The Corporation's
Obligations of Disclosure Under the Federal Securities Laws When It Is Not Trading in Its Stock, 15
N.Y.L.F. 385, 391-92 (1969); Sheffey, Securities Law Responsibilities of Issuers To Respond to Ru-
mors and Other Publicity: Reexamination of a Continuing Problem, 57 No'rt-. DA .E LAw. 755,
760-70 (1982). Some have argued, however, that 10b-5 either does impose or should impose a contin-
uing duty on the corporation to disclose all material information. See, e.g., Bauman, Rule lob-5 and
the Corporation's Affirmative Duty To Disclose, 67 GEo. L.J. 935 (1979); Flom & Atkins, The
Expanding Scope of SEC Disclosure Laws, HARV. Bus. RE v., July-Aug. 1974, at 109, 112; Tales-
nick, Corporate Silence and Rule I0b-5: Does a Publicly Held Corporation Have an Affirmative
Duty To Disclose?, 49 DEN. L.J. 369 (1973). The SEC encourages prompt announcement of material
corporate information, but has never imposed such a disclosure requirement. See Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 8995, 11970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 77,915, at 80,035 (Oct. 15,
1970) (no requirement of immediate disclosure except when corporate insiders trade in corporation's
stock).
21. See supra note 5.
22. See NYSE MANUAL., supra note 2, §§ 801-809, at 23,171-23,184; ASE GUIDF, supra
note 2, §§ 1001-1005 (1973). Recent cases indicate, however, that violation of exchange rules alone
will not support a private cause of action for damages. See, e.g., Carrott v. Shearson Hayden Stone,
Inc., 724 F.2d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 1984) (no private right of action for violation of NYSE "know your
customer" rule); State Teachers Retirement Board v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981) (vio-
lation by corporation of NYSE rule mandating disclosure in the event of unusual activity does not give
rise to implied federal right of action).
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"is expected to release quickly to the public any news or information
which might reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for
securities."23 Like Rule 10b-5, however, the rules of the NYSE and
American Stock Exchange (ASE) permit a corporation to delay disclosure
of material information if immediate disclosure would impede the com-
pany's pursuit of valid corporate objectives, at least where the information
can be confined to a small group of individuals.24
II. DISCLOSURE OF MERGER NEGOTIATIONS
A. Stock Exchange Disclosure Requirements: The "No Corporate
Development" Statement
The rules of the major stock exchanges require that a corporation pub-
licly explain any rumors concerning the corporation and explain unusual
market activity in its stock. Alternatively, a corporation may issue a state-
ment that it knows of "no corporate development" that would account for
the unusual activity.25 "No corporate development" statements are consid-
ered an effective check on unwarranted speculation in a corporation's
stock; the statement is intended to inform the market whether rumored
developments have in fact occurred.2 6 Absent corporate awareness of leaks
of confidential information, the stock exchanges do not require a corpora-
tion to disclose preliminary merger negotiations in response to a request
for a "no corporate development" statement.2 7 Because the stock ex-
changes have not taken disciplinary action against corporations that issue
23. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 2, § 202.05, at T 23,519; see also ASE GUIDE, supra note 2, §
401(a), at 23,124A ("a listed company is required to make immediate public disclosure of all mate-
rial information concerning its affairs").
24. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 2, § 202.01, at 23,515 (premature public announcement may
properly be delayed for valid business purpose "where adequate security can be maintained"); ASE
GUIDE, supra note 2, § 402(a), at 23,124B (similar provisions).
25. The New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual provides that
If rumors or unusual market activity'indicate that information on impending developments
has been leaked out, a frank and explicit announcement is clearly required. If rumors are in
fact false or inaccurate, they should be promptly denied or clarified. A statement to the effect
that the company knows of no corporate developments to account for the unusual market activ-
ity can have a salutary effect. . . . If rumors are correct or there are developments, an imme-
diate candid statement to the public as to the state of negotiations or of development of corpo-
rate plans in the rumored area must be made directly and openly.
NYSE MANUA., supra note 2, § 202.03, at 1 23,517. When rumors develop or unusual price changes
occur, or when there is an unexplained influx of buy or sell orders, an exchange official routinely will
contact the company to request that a statement be made pursuant to the exchange's rules. NYSE
MANUAl., supra note 2, § 202.04, at 1 23,518; ASE GUIDE, supra note 2, at T 23,124B.
26. NYSE MANUAl., supra note 2, § 202.04, at T 23,518; ASE GUIDE, supra note 2, § 402(a), at
23,124B.
27. This reflects the exchanges' view that the decision as to whether a "no corporate develop-
ment" statement is appropriate in response to a stock exchange inquiry during preliminary merger
negotiations is generally best left to the corporation and its counsel. Telephone interview with
William Bors, Managing Director, Corporate Liaison Division, and Bruno Lederer, Assistant Gen-
eral Counsel, New York Stock Exchange (Oct. 20, 1986) [hereinafter NYSE Interview].
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"no corporate development" statements during preliminary merger
negotations, 28 management may at least temporarily avoid disclosing such
negotiations. The exchanges' acceptance of delayed disclosure may
demonstrate their awareness that the damage to shareholders resulting
from premature disclosure would probably outweigh the benefits of
disclosure.
B. "No Corporate Development" Statements Under Rule lOb-5
"No corporate development" statements made during preliminary
merger negotiations are subject to Rule 10b-5. Whereas Rule 10b-5 does
not impose an affirmative obligation on a corporation to disclose the fact
that it is engaged in preliminary merger negotiations, 0 the courts that
have specifically considered whether "no corporate development" state-
ments issued during preliminary merger negotiations violate Rule 10b-5
have reached inconsistent results.
In Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.,S plaintiffs claimed that Heublein vio-
lated Rule 10b-5 by failing, in its response to a NYSE request, to disclose
that it was engaged in preliminary negotiations regarding the possible ac-
quisition of the corporation by R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. Heublein
instead issued a "no corporate development" statement. 2 The Third Cir-
cuit held that, as a matter of law, Heublein's "no corporate development"
statement was not "false, inaccurate, or misleading."33 Holding that Heu-
blein had no duty to disclose that it was engaged in preliminary merger
negotiations, the court further reasoned that because Heublein had no in-
28. Id.
29. Even when the letter of the stock exchange rules might appear to require disclosure in a given
instance, exchange officials may be willing to forego disciplinary action against a corporation if its
reason for noncompliance is sufficently compelling. The NYSE listing agreement provides that where
strict compliance with the conditions of the listing agreement is difficult "the Exchange is inclined to
place the emphasis upon the spirit, rather than upon the letter, of the agreement . . . ." NEw YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL § A-34 (1985); see Feuerstein, supra note 20, at 391
("[T]imely disclosure should ordinarily be enforced informally by the self-regulatory bodies rather
than formally by the Commission.").
30. See Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672
F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982); cf. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388, 398
(8th Cir. 1976) (tender offeror not required to disclose details of a proposed merger); Susquehanna
Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1084-86 (5th Cir. 1970) (offeror need not explicitly
disclose potential merger plans).
31. 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985).
32. In mid-1981, the General Signal Corporation began to accumulate Heublein shares on the
open market. Regarding this activity as hostile, Heublein in July 1982 began negotiations with Reyn-
olds, a potential friendly merger partner. On July 14, unusual trading volume in Heublein stock
prompted the NYSE to request a "no corporate development" statement from Heublein. On the same
day, Heublein stated that "the Company was aware of no reason that would explain the activity in its
stock in trading on the NYSE today." 742 F.2d at 754. Negotiations between Heublein and Reynolds
proceeded, and on July 27 an agreement in principle for the acquisition of Heublein by Reynolds was
reached. On July 28 Heublein publicly disclosed the existence of the agreement in principle to merge.
33. 742 F.2d at 759.
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dication that information regarding the merger negotiations had been re-
leased or that insider trading was occurring, Heublein's "no corporate de-
velopment" statement did not violate Rule 1Ob-5.3 4
Explicitly declining to follow Greenfield, the Sixth Circuit held in Lev-
inson v. Basic Inc.," on facts similar to those before the court in Green-
field, that statements made by Basic denying the existence of merger nego-
tiations and asserting that Basic knew of no corporate development to
account for unusually heavy trading in its stock could not be held as a
matter of law to be neither false nor misleading under Rule 10b-5."
Likewise, in Schlanger v. Four-Phase Systems, Inc.,"' the court rejected
the reasoning of Greenfield and held that the question of whether a "no
corporate development" statement made during preliminary merger nego-
tiations was false or misleading under Rule 10b-5 could not be resolved as
a matter of law in defendant's favor on a motion for summary judgment."
The SEC has also rejected the reasoning of Greenfield. In In re
Carnation Co.," the SEC announced that Greenfield "was wrongly de-
34. This holding was reached despite the court's recognition that Heublein "clearly knew of infor-
mation that might have accounted for the increase in trading. . . ." 742 F.2d at 759. With respect to
the possibility that information regarding the negotiations had leaked to the public, the court reasoned
that despite the unusual market activity, "because of the confidential nature of these discussions, there
was no basis for [Heublein] to believe . . . that any of the details of these discussions, not previously
known to the public, had been recently leaked." Id. (footnote omitted).
35. 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986).
36. 786 F.2d at 747-49. Levinson arose out of plaintiffs' sale of Basic stock during preliminary
negotiations between Basic and Combustion Engineering, Inc. that eventually led to the acquisition of
Basic by Combustion Engineering. As in Greenfield, plaintiffs claimed that three of Basics public
statements made during the merger negotiations were false or misleading because they failed to dis-
close the negotiations. In the first contested statement, a Basic official stated to a newspaper reporter
that "the company knew no reason for the stock's activity and that no negotiations were under way
with any company for a merger." Id. at 744. In the second and third statements at issue, Basic stated
in response to NYSE inquiries that "management is unaware of any present or pending corporate
development that would result in the abnormally heavy trading activity and price fluctuation in com-
pany shares that have been experienced in the past few days." Id. at 745.
Although the Levinson court criticized the Third Circuit's holding in Greenfield, the two cases are
not necessarily inconsistent. Unlike Heublein, Basic, in a voluntary public statement to a newspaper
reporter, affirmatively denied that merger negotiations were being conducted. Moreover, Basie's "no
corporate development" statements, unlike Heublein's, stated that the company knew of no present or
pending corporate development that would account for the unusual activity in its stock. Specifically
denying the existence of pending developments, Basics "no corporate development" statement was
affirmatively misleading in a way that Heublein's was not.
37. 582 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Schlanger arose out of negotiations which eventually led
to the acquisition by Motorola of Four-Phase Systems, Inc. During the period in which preliminary
negotiations were underway, Four-Phase was contacted by a NYSE official and asked to comment on
a sudden rise in the market price and trading volume in the company's stock. Four-Phase responded
by stating that "the Company is not aware of any corporate developments which would affect the
market of its stock." Id. at 129.
38. Id. at 133.
39. In re Carnation Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at
87,592 (July 8, 1985). This release arose out of the SEC's investigation into unusual trading activity
which occurred during preliminary acquisition negotiations between Nestle, S.A. and Carnation
Company. After rumors began to circulate about a possible acquisition and the exchange observed
unusual activity in Carnation stock, Carnation issued a public statement that "[t]here is no news from
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cided," and argued instead that a "no corporate development" statement
issued while the corporation is conducting preliminary merger negotia-
tions is materially false or misleading and violates Rule 10b-5.40 Accord-
ing to the SEC, "[i]f the issuer is aware of nonpublic information concern-
ing acquisition discussions that are occurring at the time the statement is
made, the issuer has an obligation to disclose sufficient information con-
cerning the discussions to prevent the statements made from being materi-
ally misleading." '41
C. The Disclosure Quandary
The interaction between management's goal of shareholder wealth
maximization, stock exchange rules requiring public statements in re-
sponse to unusual market activity, and the current uncertainty as to the
sufficiency under 10b-5 of "no corporate development" statements leaves
corporate management facing a difficult dilemma. Although the success of
merger negotiations may depend on maintaining confidentiality, the de-
mands of stock exchange disclosure requirements and recent interpreta-
tions of Rule 10b-5 by some courts and the SEC may force management
to disclose the negotiations.
Disclosure of the status of merger negotiations may lead to their break-
down and the consequent loss to shareholders of valuable merger premi-
ums. Corporate mergers4 typically result in gains to target shareholders.
Shareholders generally receive-either in cash or in the securities of the
acquiring firm-an amount significantly in excess of the market price of
their stock at the time of the merger.4" Acquiring corporations are able to
pay these substantial merger premiums because of anticipated gains from
increased operating efficiency or economies of scale.44
the company and no corporate developments that would account for the stock action." Id. at 87,594.
40. Id. at 87,596-97 & n.8.
41. Id. at 87,595.
42. The term "merger" is used throughout this Note to refer both to statutory mergers and to
friendly cash tender offers undertaken as the first step of a plan by the acquiror to later merge the two
corporations.
43. Mergers result, on average, in gains to target shareholders of 20%. Jensen & Ruback, The
Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 7-15 (1983). When
Carnation merged with Nestle, for example, Carnation shareholders received $83 per share, a pre-
mium of 38% over the price of the stock three months prior to the merger agreement. See In re
Carnation Co., 11984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,592, 87,595
(July 8, 1985).
44. The extent to which these anticipated post-merger gains are actually realized by acquiring
firms is unclear. Compare Jensen & Ruback, supra note 43, at 11, 16 (acquirors gain 3.8%) and
Langeteig, An Application of a Three-Factor Performance Index To Measure Stockholder Gains
from Merger, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 381 (1978) (mergers result in "normal or slightly superior return
for the acquiring firm's stockholders") with Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Merger Activity and the
Objective Functions of Merging Firms, 11 J. FIN. EcoN. 155 (1983) (acquiring firms lose over long
term) and Hogarty, The Profitability of Corporate Mergers, 43 J. Bus. 317, 325-26 (1970) (few
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Public disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations often leads to the
breakdown of negotiations and the consequent loss of valuable merger
premiums. This occurs for two reasons. First, acquiring corporations as a
matter of course demand confidentiality in negotiating mergers and will
react negatively to disclosure. Second, disclosure may drive the price of
the target corporation's stock so high that the premium which must be
offered in order to consummate the merger is prohibitive and the negotia-
tions are abandoned.4 6 As a result, shareholders47 benefit from the mainte-
nance of corporate silence concerning preliminary merger negotiations. 4
8
mergers result in gains for acquiror). See also Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control:
A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1145, 1173 (1984) (corporate control contests sometimes create wealth and sometimes only redistrib-
ute it); Mason & Goudzwaard, Performance of Conglomerate Firms: A Portfolio Approach, 31 J.
FIN. 39, 45 (1976) (randomly selected portfolios outperform conglomerate firm portfolios).
45. For example, during the recent merger negotiations between Nestle and Carnation, Nestle
told Carnation that if Carnation made any public disclosure of the fact that the two corporations were
engaged in negotiations toward Nestle's acquisition of Carnation, Nestle would terminate the discus-
sions. In re Carnation Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at
87,593 (July 8, 1985). Similarly, the chairman of the American Bar Association's Committee on the
Federal Regulation of Securities has stated that premature disclosure "may well interfere with the
consummation of a corporate transaction." Lunzer, "No comment", FORBES, Sept. 16, 1985, at 41
[hereinafter No Comment].
An important reason for corporate management's concern for confidentiality is management's fear
that disclosure may trigger a bidding contest for the target corporation. In general, target management
will prefer negotiated mergers to bidding contests, because in a negotiated merger management is
better able to select a "compatible" merger partner and/or negotiate an attractive severance package.
Management's decision to enter into merger negotiations is discretionary, and an increased likelihood
of public disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations will reduce management's incentive to enter
into negotiations in the first place, thereby resulting in lost merger opportunities for shareholders.
46. See Affirmative Duty, supra note 12, at 1244; Willensky, Making It Happen: How To Exe-
cute an Acquisition, Bus. HORIZONS, Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 38, 44. The SEC itself is aware of this
effect. Langley, SEC To Require Some Disclosure of Merger Talks, Wall St. J., July 9, 1985, at 3,
col. I (statement of SEC senior enforcement counsel that when disclosure occurs, target company's
stock price may rise to premium level offered by potential acquiror). Of course, when the merger
negotiations terminate as a result of this disclosure, the stock price drops, often to a level below the
pre-negotiation price. Bleakley, The Perils of the Takeover Game, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1984, § 3, at
10, col. 2.
47. This refers to shareholders in the aggregate. Those shareholders who sell their shares during
the pendency of preliminary merger negotiations would arguably be better off with early disclosure,
and shareholders of acquiring firms might also desire early disclosure so as to discourage mergers
which do not maximize their individual wealth. The potential losses which these groups might suffer,
however, are small in comparison with the gains realizable by target shareholders who do not sell
their shares prior to the announcement of a merger. See infra note 79; see also sources cited supra
note 43 (loss to acquiring firms' shareholders, if any, is small in comparison with gain to acquired
firms' shareholders). Moreover, investors can completely eliminate their risk by holding a diversified
portfolio of stocks. Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 8-9 (1982).
48. Where disclosure does not cause the merger negotiations to terminate and a successful merger
eventually occurs, either with the initial bidder or with a subsequent offeror, the target corporation's
shareholders are likely to be better off than if there had been no disclosure. This result comes about
because disclosure drives up the stock price, and consequently also the price paid in a merger or
acquisition. However, the shareholders' ex ante expected return is lower with disclosure because of
the increased likelihood that the merger negotiations will terminate and the premium will be lost.
Furthermore, although competitive bidding will result in higher merger premiums in successful merg-
ers, it will impair shareholder welfare by reducing the frequency of mergers. This will occur for two
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It is only when an agreement in principle to merge49 has been reached
and the possibility of upsetting the negotiations by disclosure is minimal
that shareholders are likely to be well served by disclosure. Maintaining
the secrecy of preliminary merger negotiations, then, is at a minimum
consistent with, and may even be required by, corporate management's
fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth.
Silence or a simple "no comment," on the other hand, may lead to ex-
treme exchange sanctions, such as delisting or suspension of trading in the
corporation's stock. In addition, the "no corporate development" state-
ment, accepted by the exchanges as an alternative to full disclosure where
there is unusual trading activity, may give rise to potentially huge damage
claims under 10b-5 by shareholders who sell during the preliminary
merger negotiations.
As merger activity has accelerated, so has the number of "no corporate
development" statements. The NYSE has requested the issuance of ap-
proximately twenty "no corporate development" statements in the past
twenty months alone.50 Since the 1984 SchIanger decision, the SEC's
1985 finding in Carnation, and the Levinson decision, however, corpora-
tions-and their shareholders-have been faced with the prospect of crip-
pling liability for making these statements.51
reasons: First, if the result of an attempted friendly merger is a takeover by a potentially unfriendly
third party, target management will not be inclined to undertake merger negotiations. See supra note
45. Second, acquirors will invest less in searching for potential merger partners if this search merely
triggers a bidding contest ending with the target corporation merging with a third party. Easterbrook
and Fischel have made a similar argument in the context of hostile takeovers. See Easterbrook &
Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L.
REv. 1161 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 47 (arguing that shareholder wealth is maxi-
mized ex ante when target management does not undertake defensive tactics which would impede
successful acquisitions). But see Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95
HARV. L. REv. 1028 (1982) (arguing that shareholder wealth is maximized by facilitating competing
bids); Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L.
REv. 51 (1982) (same).
49. An agreement in principle has been held to exist when the negotiating corporations reach
fundamental agreement on both the price and the structure of a merger. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.,
742 F.2d 751, 757 (3d Cir. 1984) ("with both price and structure agreed to, there is only a minimal
chance that a public announcement would quash the deal. ), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189
(1985).
50. NYSE Interview, supra note 27.
51. In Schlanger, for example, plaintiff represented the class of Four-Phase shareholders who
sold their stock between the time of the "no corporate development" statement and the announcement
of the merger. The claimed damages in that case, based on the changes in stock price over an eight-
day period, were approximately $10 million. The potential liability of other corporations issuing "no
corporate development" statements is equally huge. See No Comment, supra note 45, at 41 (quoting
statement by financial public relations executive that "our clients are scared to death" about potential
liability after Carnation); Kaufmann & Hoyns, supra note 7, at 7, col. 1 ("The options ... availa-
ble to a company on receiving an exchange inquiry when it does not wish to disclose confidential
information present a choice among negatives .... ").
It has been suggested that a corporation asked to issue a "no corporate development" statement may
simply refuse, or issue a "no comment." Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 763 (3d Cir.
1984) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985); Kaufmann & Hoyns,
Rule 10b-5 Duty To Disclose
III. A PROPOSED STANDARD OF MATERIALITY FOR THE DISCLOSURE
OF MERGER NEGOTIATIONS
The goal of maximizing shareholder wealth requires that corporations
delay disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations until discussions have
reached a stage where disclosure is unlikely to result in their termination.
Delay can be facilitated in either of two ways: by changing current stock
exchange disclosure requirements or by holding that the failure to disclose
merger negotiations in a "no corporate development" statement does not
violate Rule 10b-5.
A. Changing the Stock Exchange Rules
Avoiding premature disclosure of merger negotiations could be achieved
through a change in existing stock exchange rules. Such a change would
involve either eliminating "no corporate development" statements alto-
gether or permitting a corporation to issue a "no comment" statement
while engaged in preliminary merger negotiations."2 There are serious
problems, however, with both of these possible solutions.
"No corporate development" statements provide valuable information to
the market when, as is often the case, unusual market activity is the result
of unfounded rumors. "No corporate development" statements may be re-
quired not only in the case of rumors about potential mergers, but also,
for example, where unusual trading is occurring based on false rumors of
the death or defection of a key executive or of developments concerning
a critical contract or project. Because "no corporate development"
supra note 7, at 6, col. 6; Comment, supra note 12, at 1177. This was RCA's response to a stock
exchange inquiry about the rising price of its stock during its merger negotiations with General Elec-
tric. RCA Trading Before GE Pact Probed by SEC, Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1985, at 2, col. 2. Either of
these responses, however, violates exchange rules and may result in stock exchange sanctions. See
supra text accompanying notes 21-23. Moreover, although violation of stock exchange rules does not
give rise to a private right of action, see supra note 22, delisting by the NYSE or the ASE might form
the basis of a stockholder lawsuit. Kaufmann & Hoyns, supra note 7, at 7, col. 1. Of course, a "no
comment" has the additional significant disadvantage of signaling to the market that the corporation is
involved in merger negotiations, see infra note 54 and accompanying text.
52. The SEC allows the "no comment" statement in some circumstances. The Commission ob-
served in a footnote to Carnation that "an issuer that wants to prevent premature disclosure of non-
public preliminary merger negotiations can, in appropriate circumstances, give a "no comment" re-
sponse to press inquiries concerning rumors or unusual market activity." In re Carnatione Co.,
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,596 n.6 (July 8, 1985). By
contrast, the "no comment" statement made in response to a stock exchange inquiry is in direct viola-
tion of exchange rules, see supra note 51. In the event that a listed company either fails to respond to
a NYSE inquiry or simply issues a "no comment" statement, the NYSE's current policy is to issue its
own statement to the press explaining that unusual activity was observed in the company's stock, that
the company was contacted and a statement was requested, and that the company either failed to
explain the unusual activity or simply responded with a "no comment." NYSE Interview, supra note
27.
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statements are useful in curbing unwarranted speculation, their blanket
elimination would- be inadvisable. 3
Permitting a corporation to respond with a simple "no comment"
rather than a "no corporate development" statement when merger negoti-
ations are under way is equally problematic. Because a "no comment"
will presumably be issued only when the corporation is engaged in pre-
liminary merger negotiations, the issuance of such a statement will give a
clear signal to the market that merger negotiations are being conducted
and thus may give rise to the same problems that result from explicit
disclosure. 4 In any event, the SEC controls the mechanism for changing
exchange rules55 and would likely discourage any attempt to relax the
exchanges' disclosure requirements.5
B. The "False or Misleading" Approach
To support liability under Rule 10b-5, a corporate statement or omis-
sion must be (1)false or misleading as to (2) a material fact.17 Courts
may avoid the imposition of liability under Rule 10b-5 either by holding
the failure to disclose neither false nor misleading, or by holding it
immaterial.
In judging the legality under Rule 1 Ob-5 of corporate statements made
during merger negotiations, courts and the SEC-apparently assuming
materiality-have focused on whether a given statement or omission was
false or misleading. In Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.,58 for example, the
court refused to hold Heublein liable under 10b-5 for issuing a "no
53. As the NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL explains, a "no corporate development" statement
"can have a salutary effect" on the stability of the market for a corporation's stock. NYSE MANUAL,
supra note 2, § 202.03, at 1 23,517.
54. This concern is illustrated by the response of a corporate official asked by a reporter whether
the corporation was engaged in any merger discussions: "No comment. . . .If [merger talks] were the
case, we'd certainly not want to comment on it ...and if they aren't the case, we'd probably not
want to comment on it, just to be consistent and not to tip our hand if it ever comes up in the future."
Most Objects of Merger Rumors Say Very Little When Asked What's Up, Wall St. J., July 9, 1981, at
27, col. 4. As this anecdote demonstrates, the disclosure dilemma facing corporate officials who must
respond to stock exchange inquiries is not eliminated by simply permitting the corporation to remain
silent or respond with a "no comment." Corporate silence or a "no comment" during a period of
unusual market activity-particularly if accompanied by rumors of a merger-will be a red flag to the
market that merger negotiations are being conducted and may result in the same problems that result
from explicit disclosure.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)-(c) (1982).
56. This is in keeping with the Commission's general, albeit mistaken, view that investors are
uniformly best served by full and immediate disclosure. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 8995, 3
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) I 23,120A, at 17,095-2 (encouraging corporate managements to "set up
procedures which will insure that prompt disclosure be made of material corporate developments, both
favorable and unfavorable, so that investor confidence can be maintained in an orderly and effective
securities market").
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1986).
58. 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985).
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corporate development" statement during the course of preliminary
merger negotiations. Even though management was aware that unusual
trading might have been due to the negotiations, Heublein's management
was not aware of any leaks or insider trading, and the court therefore
ruled as a matter of law that the statement was not false, misleading, or
inaccurate.59
Greenfield's analysis has been vigorously attacked on the ground that
given the circumstances surrounding the unusual market activity in Heu-
blein stock, it was in fact false or misleading for Heublein to state that it
knew of no reason for the unusual activity. Courts and commentators
alike have argued that Greenfield adopts an overly restrictive view of
what statements are false or misleading under Rule 10b-5."0 Indeed, it is
easy to envision the unwarranted contraction of the "false or misleading"
standard in other situations involving Rule 10b-5 if the Greenfield ap-
proach were to be accepted: The failure to disclose in corporate statements
or reports the existence of large contingent liabilities arising from law-
suits, for example, might logically be excused on the ground that although
the corporation knew that it might have to pay out a huge judgment, it
did not know that the liability would come to pass. Greenfield, with its
emphasis on the "false or misleading" nature of the "no corporate devel-
opment" statement, represents a misguided judicial attempt to resolve the
disclosure quandary which confronts corporations during preliminary
merger negotiations.
C. The Materiality Approach
Analysis of "no corporate development" statements under Rule 10b-5
has focused exclusively on whether a given statement was false or mislead-
ing under the circumstances.61 Although merger negotiations may be intu-
59. 742 F.2d at 759.
60. For criticisms of Greenfield, see In re Carnation Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,801, at 87,592 (July 8, 1985); Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., 582 F. Supp. 128,
132 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[Tlhe Greenfield decision is wrong, essentially because it fails to distinguish
between cases involving false or misleading statements, and situations involving a decision merely to
remain silent and not disclose pre-merger negotiations."); Kaufmann & Hoyns, supra note 7, at 6,
col. 4 (Greenfield's "false or misleading" analysis unconvincing); Comment, supra note 12, at 1174
(arguing that "[t]he majority erred. . . when it reasoned that Heublein did not breach its duty not to
mislead merely because the [no corporate development] statement contained no false information").
The leading treatment of the contours of "misleading" for lOb-5 purposes is Jacobs, What is a
Misleading Statement or Omission Under Rule lOb-5?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 243 (1973). Regard-
ing the determination of whether a corporate press release is misleading, one court held that "[tihe
misleading, misrepresented or untruthful character of the release may appear from the nature of the
statement considered alone, or. . .from the half truths, omissions or absence of full candor .... "
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 97 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004
(1971) and 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
61. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d at 757; In re Carnation Co., [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 83,801, at 87,595-97 (July 8, 1985).
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itively "material," there is substantial support for holding that, for
purposes of imposing lOb-5 liability, nondisclosure of such negotiations
through a "no corporate development" statement is not a material
omission.
1. The Judicial Definition of Materiality
The language and legislative history of the Securities Acts provide little
guidance as to what facts are "material" for disclosure purposes. 2 Conse-
quently, the definition of materiality under 10b-5 is primarily a judicial
creation. The currently accepted standard was enunciated by the Supreme
Court in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.:63 A fact is material if there is
"a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
'total mix' of information made available."64
The test set forth by the Supreme Court in TSC does not, of course,
solve the question of what statements or omissions are material; it merely
sets forth the broad outline of materiality. Because of the ambiguity inher-
ent in such a fact-sensitive inquiry, what is "material" in a given case
depends in large part on whether a finding of materiality would promote
the policy objectives underlying the Securities Acts.6" For example, despite
their obvious interest to investors, corporate forecasts and projections have
also been deemed immaterial for purposes of disclosure under the Securi-
ties Acts on the ground that disclosure of such information is inherently
misleading and likely to harm investors.66 On the other hand, courts have
62. Neither the 1933 Act nor the 1934 Act defines materiality. See Bauman, supra note 20, at
937-38 n.11. The legislative histories, H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) and H.R. REP.
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), are likewise of little help.
63. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). Although TSC arose under SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9
(1985), in the context of a proxy solicitation, its test of materiality has been widely applied to actions
arising under Rule l0b-5. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 187 (2d Cir. 1981);
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 289 (7th Cir. 1981); Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of
Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 1980).
64. 426 U.S. at 449 (1976).
65. For a comprehensive discussion of the concept of materiality under the Securities Acts, see
Hewitt, supra note 3. Hewitt observes that "over time, the context in which the concept of materiality
is applied changes. . . . While the definition of materiality may remain constant, the determination of
whether a particular fact is material may vary." Id. at 898. See also Bauman, supra note 20, at 937
n.11 (courts apply different standards of materiality in different contexts, and "information may be
defined as material for some purposes but not for others").
66. See Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985) (projections and asset
appraisals material only if underlying predictions are "substantially certain to hold"); Flynn v. Bass
Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 985 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[als a matter of public policy, the SEC and the
courts generally have not required the inclusion of appraised asset valuations, projections, and other
'soft' information in proxy materials or tender offers"); James v. Gerber Prod. Co., 587 F.2d 324, 327
(6th Cir. 1978) ("sales figures, projections, forecasts and the like only rise to the level of materiality
when they can be calculated with substantial certainty"). The SEC has made small steps toward
permitting disclosure of certain types of projections and forecasts by enacting a "safe harbor" rule for
projections prepared with a reasonable basis and disclosed in good faith. See Safe Harbor Rule for
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long recognized that a corporate development which is not material for
disclosure purposes must be disclosed when insiders trade in the corpora-
tion's stock.6 7
The flexibility of the materiality standard is particularly apparent in
the series of recent cases involving allegations that management's failure
to disclose preliminary merger negotiations violated the corporation's duty
to disclose under Rule 10b-5.11 Despite the apparent materiality of these
preliminary merger negotiations under the TSC test, the courts have not
required corporations to disclose such negotiations, instead ruling that
they are "immaterial as a matter of law." 9 Nondisclosure in this context
has been held constructively immaterial for two reasons. First, courts have
recognized that disclosure would result in lost or frustrated merger oppor-
tunities.70 Second, because preliminary merger negotiations are by their
nature fluid and their outcomes uncertain, courts have reasoned that dis-
closure itself may be misleading to investors.71
Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, 11979 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,117, at 81,943 (June 25, 1979).
67. See SEC v. Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 48 (2d Cir. 1976); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
68. See, e.g., Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983); Staffin v. Greenberg,
672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982); Comment, supra note 12, at 1160 ("[Cjoncerns for discouraging undue
speculation and for protecting the shareholder's ultimate benefit upon a consummated merger have led
courts to hold that, as a matter of law, preliminary merger negotiations are not material developments
that need to be disclosed . . ").
69. See Reiss, 711 F.2d at 14; Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1206; Nutis v. Penn Merchandising Corp., 615
F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Pa. 1985); see also Paul v. Berkman, 620 F. Supp. 638 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (rule of
immateriality applies only to mergers, not sales of assets). The SEC has recently argued that prelimi-
nary merger negotiations should be considered material prior to the point of agreement on price and
structure. Brief of SEC as Amicus Curiae at 1, Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Nos. 84-1631, 84-1714) (arguing in case involving closely-held corporation that "merger negotiations
may become material at a far earlier stage" than agreement on price and structure).
70. For example, the court in Staffin reasoned that "[i]f word of the impending offer becomes
public, the price of the stock will rise towards the expected tender price. Thus, the primary induce-
ment to stockholders-an offer to purchase their shares at an attractive price above the market-is
lost, and the offeror may be forced to abandon its plans ...." 672 F.2d at 1206 (citation omitted).
71. This has been the primary justification put forth by courts for a rule holding preliminary
merger negotiations immaterial as a matter of law and thus not subject to disclosure. The Second
Circuit in Reiss, for example, based its holding that the negotiations in question were immaterial on
the fact that preliminary merger negotiations "are inherently fluid and the eventual outcome is
shrouded in uncertainty. Disclosure may in fact be more misleading than secrecy so far as investment
decisions are concerned." 711 F.2d at 14. Similarly, the Third Circuit in Staffin held that "[tihe
reason that preliminary merger discussions are immaterial as a matter of law is that disclosure of
them may itself be misleading." 672 F.2d at 1206 (one of two separate justifications).
This justification for allowing nondisclosure, though popular, may be open to criticism. According
to the efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH), stock prices react quickly and accurately to any
new information. See Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25
J. FIN. 383 (1970); see also Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L.
REV. 549 (1984) (discussing mechanisms by which new information is impounded in stock prices);
Note, supra note 12 (suggesting application of ECMH to securities regulation). For a discussion of
the ECMH as it applies to materiality under Rule lOb-5, see Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient
Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373 (1984).
While accurate disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations is not inherently misleading to inves-
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2. Materiality and "No Corporate Development" Statements
As long as a corporation remains silent, it will not be held liable under
Rule 10b-5 for failing to disclose preliminary merger negotiations.72 Some
courts and the SEC, however, have distinguished the situation in which
the corporation fails to disclose preliminary merger negotiations but,
rather than remaining silent, makes some kind of an affirmative state-
ment. The argument made by the Levinson7" and Schlangere courts, and
by the SEC,75 is that there is a fundamental difference under Rule 10b-5
between the situation in which a corporation remains silent during pre-
liminary merger negotiations and the situation in which it makes a public
statement (whether solicited or not). They contend that "information con-
cerning ongoing acquisition discussions becomes material by virtue of the
statement denying their existence."'7 6 Underlying this argument appears to
be the conviction, as stated by the SEC, that "[tihe importance of accurate
and complete issuer disclosure to the integrity of the securities markets
cannot be overemphasized." '7
In fact, accurate and complete disclosure-although an important goal
of the 1934 Act-can be overemphasized. The SEC, like some courts, has
failed to recognize that preliminary merger negotiations present the un-
usual situation in which disclosure does not maximize but rather impairs
investor welfare. 8 From the perspective of the target corporation's
tors, it may be difficult or impossible to convey accurate information because of the ephemeral nature
of the negotiations. Any disclosure is likely later to be contested on grounds that it misstated the
nature of the negotiations or failed to include material facts. In fact, some courts have suggested that a
corporation might be subject to liability under Rule 10b-5 for disclosing preliminary merger negotia-
tions. Reiss, 711 F.2d at 14; Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 252, 256 (N.D. I1. 1985) (if
acquisition does not materialize, investors who purchased in reliance on corporation's premature dis-
closure "may have a solid securities law cause of action because of the inflated price they have paid").
Moreover, a corporation that discloses preliminary merger negotiations becomes subject to an on-
going duty to correct or update its initial disclosure if it subsequently becomes false or misleading. See
Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y.) (general duty to correct or revise prior public
statements which were accurate when made but which have subsequently become false or misleading),
rev'd on other grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980). Uncertainty
surrounding the necessity of updating prior merger disclosures creates an additional source of poten-
tial liability for corporate management.
72. See Reiss, 711 F.2d at 13-14; Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1196.
73. 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986).
74. 582 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
75. In re Carnation Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,801, at
87,592 (July 8, 1985).
76. Levinson, 786 F.2d at 748.
77. In re Carnation Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at
87,595 (July 8, 1985).
78. The SEC's misguided pursuit of disclosure as an end in itself has been widely observed. See,
e.g., S. PHILLIPS & J. ZECHER, THE SEC AND TrHE PUBLIC INTEREST 111-14 (1979) (SEC con-
cerned with political support maximization rather than cost-effective disclosure policies); Wu, An
Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLuM. L. REv. 260
(1968) (economically efficient disclosure policy does not exist because SEC is "dominated by lawyers
in zealous pursuit of 'fairness' and 'protection of investors'" who fail to recognize economic ramifica-
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shareholders, the losses likely to be incurred by nontrading shareholders
as a result of disclosure will be greater than the gains of shareholders who
would have traded had the negotiations not been disclosed.79
Moreover, the total gains realized by the target corporation's sharehold-
ers do not come at the expense of other investors. To the extent that merg-
ers lead to more efficient allocation of capital resources due to more effec-
tive management, product and market complementarity, operating and
financial economies, or other synergies that may be realized between the
merging companies, mergers result in net social welfare gains."0 These
social gains will be imperiled if corporations are forced to disclose prelimi-
nary merger negotiations.
3. A New Standard of Materiality
The disclosure quandary currently facing corporate management can be
resolved by extending the existing doctrine of constructive immateriality in
cases of corporate silence to cover "no corporate development" statements.
As a matter of law, a corporation's issuance of a "no corporate develop-
ment" statement in response to a stock exchange request while prelimi-
nary merger negotiations are being conducted should not be considered a
material omission of fact giving rise to 10b-5 liability. Although informa-
tion concerning merger possibilities is clearly material under the TSC
"reasonable investor" standard,"' the same considerations that have justi-
fied what is, in effect, a public policy exception to the TSC test in other
tions of disclosure policies); Note, supra note 12, at 1069 ("Belief in the virtues of disclosure. . . has
become so strong that the SEC has not considered seriously the true effects of its regulation on the
investors who it is charged with protecting."). As Kaufmann and Hoyns observed, "itihe need to
maintain confidentiality of a proposed transaction until definitive agreements have been executed is as
great as the interest of the stock market in rumors of a corporate acquisition." Kaufmann & Hoyns,
supra note 7, at 1, col. 3.
A substantial body of literature has questioned whether the SEC's mandatory disclosures are even
necessary to protect investors. These commentators have argued that there are substantial private
incentives for disclosure of material corporate information. See, e.g., Ross, The Economics of Informa-
lion and the Disclosure Regulation Debate, in IssuEs IN FINANCIAL REGULATION (F. Edwards ed.
1979). Good general reviews include J. SELIGMAN, THE SEC AND THE FUrURE OF FINANCE (1985)
and Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12.
79. This is true for two reasons. First, merger negotiations generally develop rapidly, and disclos-
ure is usually only delayed for a matter of days. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 754
(3d Cir. 1984) (delay of fifteen days), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985); Schlanger v. Four-Phase
Sys., 582 F. Supp. 128, 129-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (delay of eight days). Second, the proportion of
trading to nontrading shareholders on a given day is very small. For example, on the day that Heu-
blein issued its "no corporate development" statement-a day of unusually heavy trading-only
242,000 shares, or 1.1% of Heublein's outstanding shares, changed hands. See Greenfield, 742 F.2d at
753-54.
80. See supra notes 43-44; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 48, at 1165-74 (takeovers
beneficial to both shareholders and society).
81. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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merger nondisclosure cases82 support a finding of immateriality in this
instance.
First, avoiding premature disclosure will result in a greater number of
successfully completed mergers than a policy requiring disclosure.8 3 Sec-
ond, because preliminary merger negotiations develop rapidly and are
subject to constant change, disclosure may itself be misleading to inves-
tors.84 These similarities give judicial assessments of immateriality for "no
corporate development" statements a rational basis in prior cases that
have held that preliminary merger negotiations are immaterial as a matter
of law and are not subject to a general duty of affirmative disclosure.85
This approach solves management's disclosure dilemma without artifi-
cially stretching the definition of "false or misleading" in a way that could
be misapplied in other contexts. The narrowly drawn exception proposed
by this Note will apply only to those unusual situations in which full
disclosure of otherwise material information will tend to harm rather than
benefit investors.86
IV. INSIDER TRADING AND DISCLOSURE
The concern exhibited by courts over disclosure during preliminary
merger negotiations may stem from a belief that the unusual activity that
triggers a "no corporate development" statement is probably the result of
trading by investors on the basis of nonpublic information." The Securi-
ties Acts are not solely oriented toward maximizing the aggregate wealth
of investors. The goal of facilitating mergers-and thereby maximizing
82. See Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672
F.2d 1196, 1203-07 (3d Cir. 1982); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d
388, 398 (8th Cir. 1976); Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1084-86 (5th
Cir. 1970).
83. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also Comment, supra note 12, at 1170-73
(discussing courts' rationales for holding preliminary merger negotiations immaterial as matter of
law).
85. See, e.g., Reiss, 711 F.2d at 13-14; Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1203-04.
86. The exception is naturally limited by the unique nature of disclosure problems posed by pre-
liminary merger negotiations. First, merger negotiations-unlike many other types of corporate devel-
opments-are likely to terminate and result in a loss to shareholders if held material and subject to
disclosure. Second, successful merger negotiations uniquely result in gains not only to target share-
holders (distributive gains), but also to society at large (social gains). Both of these factors justify
carving out a limited exception to the general standard of materiality.
87. See, e.g., Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 764 ("material nonpublic information is leaked to some
'favorites' among the investing public") (Higgenbotham, J., dissenting); Schlanger, 582 F. Supp. at
132 ("No explanation of the price activity ... is suggested, other than leaks of the existence of the
merger discussions.").
Although net social welfare is enhanced by offering maximum encouragement to merger negotia-
tions, insider trading has distributional consequences. To the extent that the bulk of the gains from
mergers accrue to corporate insiders, non-insider investor welfare and confidence in the securities
markets are impaired. Forcing disclosure of negotiations would eliminate the potential gain available
to insiders by making knowledge of the negotiations available to all market participants.
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investor wealth-must be weighed against the countervailing goals of en-
suring fair trading and maintaining investor confidence in the securities
markets.88 In recognition of these considerations, courts have held uni-
formly that Rule 10b-5 prohibits trading in a corporation's stock by insid-
ers on the basis of nonpublic information. 9
It is clear that mergers are often preceded by trading based on informa-
tion not generally available to the public.90 The federal securities laws,
however, prohibit only insider trading based on a breach of fiduciary duty
or a relationship of confidentiality. 1 It is not clear by any means that
most-or even a great deal-of the "insider" trading occurring prior to
mergers violates federal insider trading laws. 2 Moreover, rather than be-
ing the result of either legal or illegal insider trading, unusual market
88. See supra note 12.
89. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830
(1974).
90. As one market professional put it, "Wall Street has more leaks than a cheap apartment's
plumbing." Illegal Insider Trading Seems To Be on Rise; Ethics Issues Muddled, Wall St. J., Mar.
2, 1984, at 1, col. 6. Studies of stock price movements indicate that mergers almost invariably are
preceded by stock price rises, indicating trading on nonpublic information. Keown & Pinkerton,
Merger Announcements and Insider Trading Activity: An Empirical Investigation, 36 J. FIN. 855
(1981). But see Stewart & Hertzberg, Wall Street Arbitragers Are Deafened by Silence on May
Stores Takeover Bid, Wall St. J., June 22, 1986, at 5, col. I [hereinafter Arbitragers] (pre-
announcement stock price drop followed by sharp price increase on announcement). Recent departures
from the typical pattern of pre-announcement stock price increases may be the result of a number of
highly publicized insider trading actions brought by the SEC in the last year. See Stewart & Hertz-
berg, Fall of Ivan Boesky Leads to Broader Probe of Insider Information, Wall St. J., Nov. 17,
1986, at 1, col. 6; Nash, An Insider Scheme Is Put in Millions, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1986, at 1, col.
3 (indictment of investment banker Dennis B. Levine); Cole, Five Indicted In Latest Insider Case,
N.Y. Times, May 29, 1986, at D1, col. 3 (five additional indictments of Wall Street professionals); see
also Arbitragers, supra, at 5, col. 2 (most arbitrageurs attributed stock price drop prior to announce-
ment of May Stores acquisition to SEC's clamping down on insider trading).
91. The legal definition of an "insider" has been restricted to one who obtains information
through a fiduciary relationship with the corporation or "misappropriates" it from an employer. The
Supreme Court has rejected the SEC's position that the Securities Acts require that all investors trade
on the basis of equal information. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983); Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 225-35 (1980); see also Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fair-
ness" Versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAw. 517, 532 (1982). Thus non-fiduciaries-barbers, taxi
drivers, waiters-may legitimately trade on the basis of nonpublic information which they obtain. In
an economic sense, of course, these investors are "insiders"-that is, they are trading on the basis of
information not widely available to the investing public. See Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of
Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857, 860-61 (1983) (distinguishing between legal and economic
definitions of insider trading).
92. Trading on nonpublic information does not necessarily constitute illegal insider trading. Some
market professionals invest substantial resources in collecting information and employ a variety of
sophisticated techniques for gathering nonpublic information about impending corporate develop-
ments. One Wall Street arbitrageur is said to have a staffer whose job it is to track the movements of
corporate jets in order to gain information about possible mergers. Metz, Use of Inside Data in the
Takeover Game Is Pervasive and Can Lead to Huge Profit, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1984, at 12, col. 1.
Other tactics for obtaining an informational advantage include monitoring trading patterns, watching
investment banks' "restricted lists" of stocks (which indicate possible merger clients), and even check-
ing prep school records to see if chief executive officers are likely to be predisposed to merge their
corporations. See Anders, Here's How Stock-Market Experts Decide Which Rumors To Act On, Wall
St. J., Feb. 4, 1986, § 2, at 1, col. 4.
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activity accompanying preliminary merger negotiations may often be due
to rumors or speculation entirely unrelated to the negotiations.93
To acknowledge that preliminary merger negotiations may be accompa-
nied by illegal insider trading does not mean that the proposed standard of
constructive immateriality should be abandoned. Recent attempts to use
Rule 10b-5 to police perceived insider trading abuses in the preliminary
merger negotiation context represent an unwarranted extension of Rule
10b-5 for at least three reasons.
First, forcing early disclosure is overbroad as a method of policing ille-
gal insider trading. Disclosure based on a presumption that someone is
probably trading on inside information is too extreme a prescription. It
would, in effect, impose a duty on corporations to make continuous dis-
closure of all material corporate developments-a result that courts and
the SEC have decisively rejected. 4 Suspected insider trading violations by
corporate insiders or their tippees should be pursued directly by the SEC
through actions against individual inside traders, not by forcing premature
corporate disclosure of merger negotiations."5
Second, because of the increased likelihood of successful mergers, share-
holders in the aggregate are likely to be better off if disclosure can be
delayed until an agreement in principle is reached, even if some insider
trading takes place.96 Although complete and immediate disclosure would
eliminate informational disparities, it would result in a net loss to
shareholders.
Third, the stock exchanges have the authority to require corporations to
make full and complete disclosures of corporate developments if rumors or
unusual activity in the corporation's stock indicates that insider trading is
occurring The exchanges are most familiar with the trading and price
patterns of individual stocks, and they have elaborate "stock watch" pro-
93. See, e.g., Anders, supra note 92 (statement of Wall Street trader that most of approximately
twenty takeover rumors he hears each day "are garbage").
94. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to distinguish
whether unusual trading is the result of illegal trading based on nonpublic information because "Jilt is
often hard to draw a line between a shrewd guess by an investor and inside information." Louis, The
Unwinnable War on Insider Trading, FORTUNE, July 13, 1981, at 72, 76.
95. Recent enforcement actions taken by the SEC against a number of Wall Street professionals
alleged to have violated insider trading laws forcefully demonstrate the agency's ability to police in-
sider trading by market insiders. See Nash, supra note 90, at 1, col. 3 (charges against Dennis B.
Levine represent largest SEC insider trading action ever undertaken); see also SEC Using New Means
To Track Insider Trading, L.A. Times, June 16, 1986, pt. IV, at 5, col. 1 (computers and interna-
tional cooperation laws making it easier to uncover insider trading).
96. Because of the relatively small number of shares changing hands in the generally brief period
between the onset of unusual market activity and the public announcement of a merger agreement, the
economic harm to shareholders prevented by eliminating insider trading through disclosure will ofter,
if not always, be smaller than the harm caused by premature disclosure.
97. See NYSE MANUAL, supra note 2, § 202.01, at 23,515; ASE GUIDE, supra note 2, §
402(d), at 23,124B.
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grams designed to detect insider trading."8 Because of their superior moni-
toring capabilities, the stock exchanges are better suited than the SEC to
determine when-if ever-shareholders are best served by immediate dis-
closure of merger negotiations."
V. CONCLUSION
Judge Friendly once observed that "[p]robably there will no more be a
perfect tender offer than a perfect trial."100 In resolving the conflicting
goals underlying the Securities Acts as they relate to corporate disclosures
of negotiations leading to mergers and tender offers, courts and the SEC
have been reluctant to determine the scope and timing of corporate dis-
closure required by SEC Rule 10b-5 with explicit reference to the costs
and benefits of disclosure. In deciding whether a given statement is mate-
rially false or misleading under 10b-5, courts have avoided inquiry into
the effects that their determinations will have on the aggregate wealth of
investors and have focused instead on whether disclosure would be desira-
ble to the paradigmatic "reasonable investor."
This analysis, like the investors it is designed to protect, is unsophistica-
ted. Maximizing the aggregate wealth of investors is one of the most co-
herent goals underlying the Securities Acts. The federal securities laws
are best viewed as pursuing primarily economic goals; an approach to
these laws which recognizes their fundamentally economic basis is there-
fore most likely to achieve rational results. The controversy over the ade-
quacy of "no corporate development" statements for the purposes of Rule
10b-5 illustrates the tension between the economically-oriented method of
analysis recommended by this Note and the prevailing approach to inter-
pretation of the securities laws taken by many courts and the SEC. Only
98. See, e.g., SEC Using New Means To Track Insider Trading, supra note 95, at 5, col. 1 (in
past three years NYSE has invested over $15 million on insider trading detection; approximately
10,000 unusual trades are investigated each year); Crudele, Big Board Forms Unit To Spot Illegal
Trades, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1985, at D8, col. 5; Noble, Stalking Stock-Trading Abuses: Big Board
Unit Investigates Insider Actions, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1981, at Dl, col. 3.
99. The primary responsibility for regulating the conduct of stock exchange member firms was
granted by the 1934 Act to the stock exchanges. See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S.
341, 351-52 (1963) (Securities Acts meant to supplement, not replace, self-regulation by exchanges);
SEC, Div. OF TRADING & EXCHANGES, STAFF REPORT ON ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND
REGULATION OF CONDUCT" OF MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN STocK EXCHANGE 47 (Jan. 3, 1962)
("The Exchange Act contemplates that the responsibility for regulation of the conduct of members of
national exchanges be divided between the exchanges and the Commission, the initial and direct re-
sponsibility being placed on the exchanges themselves.") (footnote omitted). Because their success de-
pends on maximizing the volume of trading, the exchanges "have an incentive to adopt rules that
require listed firms to disclose the amount and type of information that investors demand." Easter-
brook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 690. Exchanges are also flexible in administering existing rules
when the harm resulting from enforcing strict compliance would likely outweigh the benefits to
investors.
100. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d Cir. 1969).
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when courts and the SEC begin to consider the economic effects on corpo-
rate shareholders of forcing disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations
can this dilemma be resolved.
